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Abstract. The ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium is a strong notion of
approximation of a Nash equilibrium, where no player has an incentive
greater than ε to deviate from any of the pure strategies that she uses in
her mixed strategy. The smallest constant ε currently known for which
there is a polynomial-time algorithm that computes an ε-well-supported
Nash equilibrium in bimatrix games is slightly below 2/3. In this paper
we study this problem for symmetric bimatrix games and we provide a
polynomial-time algorithm that gives a (1/2 + δ)-well-supported Nash
equilibrium, for an arbitrarily small positive constant δ.
1 Introduction
The problem of computing Nash equilibria is one of the most fundamental prob-
lems in algorithmic game theory. It is now known that the complexity of com-
puting a Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete [4], even for two-player games [3].
Given this evidence of intractability of the problem, further research has fo-
cused on the computation of approximate Nash equilibria. In this context—and
assuming that all payoffs are normalized to be in the interval [0, 1]—the stan-
dard notion of approximation is the additive approximation with a parameter
ε ∈ [0, 1]. There are two different notions of additive approximation of Nash
equilibria: the ε-Nash equilibrium and the ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium.
An ε-Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile—one strategy for each player—
in which no player can improve her payoff by more than ε through unilateral
deviation from her strategy in the strategy profile. Several polynomial-time al-
gorithms have been proposed to find ε-Nash equilibria for ε = 1/2 [6], for
ε = (3 − √5)/2 ≈ 0.38 [5], for ε = 1/2 − 1/(3√6) ≈ 0.36 [2], and finally for
ε ≈ 0.3393 [13]. It is also known how to find ε-Nash equlibria in quasi-polynomial
time nO(logn/ε
2) for arbitrarily small ε > 0 [11], where n is the number of pure
strategies.
The notion of an ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium requires that no player
has an incentive greater than ε to deviate from any of the pure strategies she uses
in her mixed strategy. It is a notion stronger than that of an ε-Nash equilibrium:
⋆ Partially supported by the Centre for Discrete Mathematics and its Applications
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every ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium is also an ε-Nash equilibrium, but not
necessarily vice-versa. The smallest ε for which a polynomial-time algorithm
is currently known that computes an ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium in an
arbitrary bimatrix game is slightly above 0.6619 [9,7]. It is also known that
for the class of win-lose bimatrix games one can find 1/2-well-supported Nash
equilibria in polynomial time [9].
In this paper we study computation of approximate well-supported Nash
equilibria in symmetric bimatrix games, a class of bimatrix games in which
swapping the roles of the two players does not change the payoff matrices, that
is if the payoff matrix of one is the transpose of the payoff matrix of the other.
Symmetric games are an important class of games in game theory; their appli-
cations include auctions and congestion games. They have already been studied
by Nash in his seminal paper in which he introduced the concept of a Nash equi-
librium; he proved that every symmetric game has at least one symmetric Nash
equilibrium, that is one in which all players use the same mixed strategy [12].
Computing Nash equilibria in symmetric bimatrix games is known to be as
hard as computing Nash equilibria in arbitrary bimatrix games because there
is a polynomial-time reduction from the latter to the former [8]. In contrast to
arbitrary bimatrix games, it is known how to compute (1/3 + δ)-Nash equilib-
ria in symmetric bimatrix games in polynomial time, where δ > 0 is arbitrarily
small [10]. In this paper we improve our understanding of the approximability of
Nash equilibria in symmetric bimatrix games by considering the task of comput-
ing approximate well-supported Nash equilibria. Our main result is an algorithm
that computes (1/2 + δ)-well-supported Nash equilibria in symmetric bimatrix
games in polynomial time, where δ > 0 is arbitrarily small (Theorem 3).
Our (1/2 + δ)-approximation algorithm splits the analysis into two cases
that are then considered independently. The first case is based on the follow-
ing relaxation of the concept of a symmetric Nash equilibrium: we say that a
strategy profile (x, x) prevents exceeding u ∈ [0, 1] if the expected payoff of every
pure strategy in the symmetric game is at most u when the other player uses
strategy x. This is indeed a relaxation of the concept of the symmetric Nash
equilibrium because if (x∗, x∗) is a symmetric Nash equilibrium then it prevents
exceeding its value (that is, the expected payoff each player gets when they both
play strategy x∗). We justify relevance of this concept by showing that a strategy
profile (x, x) that prevents exceeding u is a u-well-supported Nash equilibrium,
so in order to provide a latter it is sufficient to find a former. Moreover, we show
that this relaxation of a symmetric Nash equilibrium is algorithmically tractable
because it suffices to solve a single linear program to find a strategy profile (x, x)
that prevents exceeding u, if there is one. The first case in our algorithm is to
solve this linear program for u = 1/2 and if it succeeds then we can immediately
report a 1/2-well-supported Nash equilibrium. Note that by the above, if there is
indeed a symmetric Nash equilibrium with value 1/2 or smaller, then the linear
program does have a solution.
If the first case in the algorithm fails to identify a 1/2-well-supported equi-
librium because the game has no symmetric Nash equilibrium with value 1/2
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or smaller, then we consider the other, and technically more challenging, case.
We use another relaxation of the concept of a symmetric Nash equilibrium: we
say that a strategy profile (x, y) well supports u ∈ [0, 1] if the expected payoff
of every pure strategy in the support of x is at least u when the other player
uses strategy y, and the expected payoff of every pure strategy in the support
of y is at least u when the other player uses strategy x. We observe that if a
strategy profile (x, y) well supports u then it is a (1 − u)-well-supported Nash
equilibrium, so in order to provide a latter it is sufficient to find a former.
Therefore, in order to obtain a (1/2+δ)-well-supported Nash equilibrium, we
are interested in finding a strategy profile (x, y) that well supports u ≥ 1/2− δ.
While it may not be easy to verify if there is such a strategy profile, let alone find
one, both can be achieved in polynomial time by solving a single linear program
if we happen to know the supports of strategies of each player in such a strategy
profile. The obvious technical obstacle to algorithmic tractability here is that
the number of all possible supports to consider is exponential in the number of
pure strategies. We overcome this difficulty by proving the main technical result
of the paper (Theorem 2) that for every symmetric Nash equilibrium (x∗, x∗)
and for every δ > 0 establishes existence of a strategy profile (x, y), with both
strategies having supports of constant size, that well supports u∗−δ, where u∗ is
the value of the Nash equilibrium. Note that by the failure of the first case every
symmetric Nash equilibrium has value larger than 1/2, and hence Theorem 2
implies that there is such a strategy profile with constant-size supports that well
supports 1/2−δ. The second case of our algorithm is to solve the linear programs
mentioned above for u = 1/2 − δ and for all supports I and J of sizes at most
κ(δ)—where κ(δ) is a constant (which depends on δ, but does not depend on
the number n of pure strategies) that is specified in Theorem 2—and to output
a solution (x, y) as soon as one is found.
In order to prove our main technical result (Theorem 2) we use the probabilis-
tic method to prove existence of constant-support strategy profiles that nearly
well support the expected payoffs of a Nash equilibrium. Our construction and
proof are inspired by the construction of Daskalakis et al. [5] used by them to
compute (3−√5)/2-Nash equilibria in bimatrix games in polynomial time, but
our analysis is different and more involved because we need to guarantee the
extra condition of nearly well supporting the equilibrium values. The general
idea of using sampling and Hoeffding bounds to prove existence of approximate
equlibria with small supports dates back to the papers of Althofer [1] and Lipton
et al. [11], who have shown that strategies with supports of size O(log n/ε2) are
sufficient for ε-Nash equilibria in games with n strategies.
2 Preliminaries
We consider bimatrix games (R,C), where R,C ∈ [0, 1]n×n are square matrices
of payoffs for the two players: the row player and the column player, respectively.
If the row player uses a strategy i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n and if the column one uses a strategy
j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, then the row player receives payoff Rij and the column player
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receives payoff Cij . We assume that the payoff values are in the interval [0, 1]; it
is easy to see that equilibria in bimatrix games are invariant under additive and
positive multiplicative transformations of the payoff matrices.
A mixed strategy x ∈ [0, 1]n is a probability distribution on the set of pure
strategies {1, 2, . . . , n}. If the row player uses a mixed strategy x and the column
player uses a mixed strategy y, then the row player receives payoff xTRy and
the column player receives payoff xTCy. A pair of strategies (x, y), the former
for the row player and the latter for the column player, is often referred to as a
strategy profile. We define the support supp(x) of a mixed strategy x to be the
set of pure strategies that have positive probability in x, i.e., supp(x) = {i : 1 ≤
i ≤ n and xi > 0}.
For every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let Ri• be the row vector of the payoffs of the payoff
matrix R when the row player uses the strategy i. Note that if the row player uses
a pure strategy i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and if the column player uses a mixed strategy y,
then the row player receives payoff Ri•y. Similarly, for every j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, let C•j
be the column vector of the payoffs of the matrix C when the column player uses
the strategy j. Note that if the column player uses a pure strategy j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
and if the row player uses a mixed strategy x, then the column player receives
payoff xTC•j .
Definition 1 (Nash equilibrium). A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile
(x∗, y∗) such that
– for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have Ri•y∗ ≤ (x∗)TRy∗, and
– for every j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, we have (x∗)TC•j ≤ (x∗)TCy∗,
or, in other words, if x∗ is a best response to y∗ and y∗ is a best response to x∗.
Definition 2 (Approximate Nash equilibrium). For every ε > 0, an ε-
Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile (x∗, y∗) such that
– for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have Ri•y∗ − (x∗)TRy∗ ≤ ε, and
– for every j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, we have (x∗)TC•j − (x∗)TCy∗ ≤ ε,
or, in other words, if x∗ is an ε-best response to y∗ and y∗ is an ε-best response
to x∗.
Definition 3 (Approximate well-supported Nash equilibrium). For ev-
ery ε > 0, an ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile (x∗, y∗)
such that
– for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and i′ ∈ supp(x∗), we have Ri•y∗ −Ri′•y∗ ≤ ε, and
– for every j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and j′ ∈ supp(y∗), we have (x∗)TC•j−(x∗)TC•j′ ≤ ε,
or, in other words, if every i′ ∈ supp(x∗) is an ε-best response to y∗ and ev-
ery j′ ∈ supp(y∗) is an ε-best response to x∗.
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Definition 4 (Symmetric game, symmetric Nash equilibrium). A bima-
trix game (R,C) is symmetric if C = RT .
A symmetric Nash equilibrium in a symmetric bimatrix game (R,RT ) is a
strategy profile (x∗, x∗) such that for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have Ri•x∗ ≤
(x∗)TRx∗. Note that then it also follows that for every j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, we have:
(x∗)TRT•j = Rj•x
∗ ≤ (x∗)TRx∗ = (Rx∗)Tx∗ = (x∗)TRTx∗.
Let us recall a fundamental theorem of Nash [12] about existence of symmet-
ric Nash equilibria in symmetric bimatrix games.
Theorem 1 ([12]). Every symmetric bimatrix game has a symmetric Nash
equilibrium.
3 Computing approximate well-supported Nash equilibria
Fix a bimatrix gameG = (R,C) for the rest of the paper, where R,C ∈ [0, 1]n×n.
We will use N to denote the number of bits needed to represent the matrices R
and C with all their entries represented in binary. We say that a strategy x is
k-uniform, for k ∈ N \ { 0 }, if xi ∈ {0, 1k , 2k , . . . , 1}, for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
3.1 Strategies that prevent exceeding a payoff
Definition 5 (Preventing exceeding payoffs). We say that a strategy x ∈
[0, 1]n for the row player prevents exceeding u ∈ [0, 1] if for every j = 1, 2, . . . , n,
we have xTC•j ≤ u or, in other words, if the column player payoff of the best
response to x does not exceed u. Similarly, we say that a strategy y ∈ [0, 1]n for
the column player prevents exceeding v ∈ [0, 1] if for every i = 1, 2, . . . , n, we
have Ri•y ≤ v or, in other words, if the row player payoff of the best response
to y does not exceed v.
For brevity, we say that a strategy profile (x, y) prevents exceeding (v, u) if
x prevents exceeding u and y prevents exceeding v.
Observe that the following system of linear constraints PE(v, u) characterizes
strategy profiles (x, y) that prevent exceeding (v, u) ∈ [0, 1]2:
n∑
i=1
xi = 1; xi ≥ 0 for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n;
n∑
j=1
yj = 1; yj ≥ 0 for all j = 1, 2, . . . , n;
Ri•y ≤ v for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n;
xTC•j ≤ u for all j = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Note that if (x, y) is a Nash equilibrium then, by definition, it prevents exceeding
(xTRy, xTCy), which implies the following Proposition.
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Proposition 1. If (x, y) is a Nash equilibrium, v ≥ xTRy, and u ≥ xTCy, then
PE(v, u) has a solution and it prevents exceeding (v, u).
By the following proposition, in order to find an ε-well-supported Nash equi-
librium it suffices to find a strategy profile that prevents exceeding (ε, ε).
Proposition 2. If a strategy profile (x, y) prevents exceeding (v, u) then it is a
max(v, u)-well-supported Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let i′ ∈ supp(x) and let i ∈ { 1, 2, . . . , n }. Then we have:
Ri•y −Ri′•y ≤ Ri•y ≤ v,
where the first inequality follows from Ri′•y ≥ 0, and the other one holds because
y prevents exceeding v. Similarly, and using the assumption that x prevents
exceeding u, we can argue that for all j′ ∈ supp(y) and j ∈ { 1, 2, . . . , n }, we
have xTC•j − xTC•j′ ≤ u. It follows that (x, y) is a max(v, u)-well-supported
Nash equilibrium. ⊓⊔
3.2 Strategies that well support a payoff
Definition 6 (Well supporting payoffs). We say that a strategy x ∈ [0, 1]n
for the row player well supports v ∈ [0, 1] against a strategy y ∈ [0, 1]n for
the column player if for every i ∈ supp(x), we have Ri•y ≥ v. Similarly, we
say that a strategy y ∈ [0, 1]n for the column player well supports u ∈ [0, 1]
against a strategy x ∈ [0, 1]n for the row player if for every j ∈ supp(y), we have
xTC•j ≥ u.
For brevity, we say that a strategy profile (x, y) well supports (v, u) if x well
supports v against y and y well supports u against x.
The following theorem states that the payoffs of every Nash equilibrium can
be nearly well supported by a strategy profile with supports of constant size.
Theorem 2. Let (x∗, y∗) be a Nash equilibrium. For every δ > 0, there are
κ(δ)-uniform strategies x, y such that the strategy profile (x, y) well supports(
(x∗)TRy∗ − δ, (x∗)TCy∗ − δ), where κ(δ) = ⌈2 ln(1/δ)/δ2⌉.
The proof of this technical result is postponed until Section 4.
Let v, u ∈ [0, 1], δ > 0, and let I and J be multisets of pure strategies of
size κ(δ). Consider the following system WS(v, u, I,J , δ) of linear constraints:
xi = ki/κ(δ) for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n;
yj = ℓj/κ(δ) for all j = 1, 2, . . . , n;
Ri•y ≥ v − δ for all i ∈ I;
xTC•j ≥ u− δ for all j ∈ J ;
where ki is the number of times i occurs in multiset I, and ℓj is the num-
ber of times j occurs in multiset J . Note that the system WS(v, u, I,J , δ) of
linear constraints characterizes κ(δ)-uniform strategy profiles (x, y), such that
supp(x) = I and supp(y) = J , that well support (v − δ, u − δ). Theorem 2
implies the following.
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Corollary 1. If (x, y) is a Nash equilibrium, v ≤ xTRy, u ≤ xTCy, and δ > 0,
then there are multisets I and J from { 1, 2, . . . , n } of size κ(δ), such that
WS(v, u, I,J , δ) has a solution and it well supports (v − δ, u− δ).
By the following proposition, in order to find an ε-well-supported Nash equi-
librium it suffices to find a strategy profile that well supports (1 − ε, 1− ε).
Proposition 3. If a strategy profile (x, y) well supports (v, u) then it is a
(
1−
min(v, u)
)
-well-supported Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let i′ ∈ supp(x) and let i ∈ { 1, 2, . . . , n }. Then we have:
Ri•y −Ri′•y ≤ 1−Ri′•y ≤ 1− v,
where the first inequality follows from Ri•y ≤ 1, and the other one holds because
y well supports v. Similarly, and using the assumption that x well supports u,
we can argue that for all j′ ∈ supp(y) and j ∈ { 1, 2, . . . , n }, we have xTC•j −
xTC•j′ ≤ 1 − u. It follows that (x, y) is a
(
1 −min(v, u))-well-supported Nash
equilibrium. ⊓⊔
3.3 The algorithm for symmetric games
Propositions 2 and 3 suggest that in order to identify a 1/2-well-supported Nash
equilibrium it suffices to find either a strategy profile that prevents exceeding
(1/2, 1/2) or one that well supports (1/2, 1/2). Moreover, verifying existence and
identifying such strategy profiles can be done efficiently by solving the linear pro-
gram PE(1/2, 1/2), and by solving linear programs WS(1/2+ δ, 1/2+ δ, I,J , δ)
for all multisets I and J of pure strategies of size κ(δ), respectively.
For arbitrary bimatrix games the above scheme may fail if none of these sys-
tems of linear constraints has a solution. Note, however, that—by Proposition 1
and Corollary 1—it would indeed succeed if we could guarantee that the game
had a Nash equilibrium with both payoffs at most 1/2, or with both payoffs at
least (1/2+δ). Symmetric bimatrix games nearly satisfy this requirement thanks
to existence of symmetric Nash equilibria in every symmetric game [12].
If (x∗, x∗) is a symmetric Nash equilibrium in a symmetric bimatrix game
(R,RT ) then—trivially—either (x∗)TRx∗ ≤ 1/2 or (x∗)TRx∗ > 1/2. In the
former case, by Proposition 1 the linear program PE(1/2, 1/2) has a solution,
and by Proposition 2 it is a (1/2)-well-supported Nash equilibrium. In the latter
case, by Corollary 1 there are multisets I and J of pure strategies of size κ(δ),
such that WS(1/2, 1/2, I,J , δ) has a solution (x, y) and it well supports (1/2−
δ, 1/2−δ). It then follows by Proposition 3 that (x, y) is a (1/2+δ)-well-supported
Nash equilibrium.
Algorithm 1 Let (R,RT ) be a symmetric game and let δ > 0.
1. If PE(1/2, 1/2) has a solution x then return (x, x).
2. Otherwise, that is if PE (1/2, 1/2) does not have a solution:
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(a) Using exhaustive search, find multisets I and J of pure strategies, both
of size κ(δ), such that WS (1/2, 1/2, I,J , δ) has a solution.
(b) Return a solution (x, y) of WS (1/2, 1/2, I,J , δ). ⊓⊔
In order to find appropriate I and J in step 2(a), an exhaustive enumeration
of all pairs of multisets I and J of size κ(δ) is done, and for each such pair the
system of linear constraintsWS(1/2, 1/2, I,J , δ) is solved. Note that the number
of κ(δ)-element multisets from an n-element set is
(
n+ κ(δ)− 1
κ(δ)
)
= nO(κ(δ)) = nO(ln(1/δ)/δ
2).
Therefore, step 2. of the algorithm requires solving nO(ln(1/δ)/δ
2) linear programs
and hence the algorithm runs in time NO(ln(1/δ)/δ
2).
Theorem 3. For every δ > 0, Algorithm 1 runs in time NO(ln(1/δ)/δ
2) and it
returns a strategy profile that is a (1/2 + δ)-well-supported Nash equilibrium.
4 Proof of Theorem 2
We use the probabilistic method: random κ(δ)-uniform strategies are drawn
by sampling κ(δ) pure strategies (with replacement) from the distributions x∗
and y∗, respectively, and Hoeffding’s inequality is used to show that the prob-
ability of thus selecting a strategy profile that well supports
(
v∗ − δ, u∗ − δ) is
positive if κ(δ) ≥ 2 ln(1/δ)/δ2, where v∗ = (x∗)TRy∗ and u∗ = (x∗)TCy∗.
Consider 2κ(δ) mutually independent random variables It and Jt, 1 ≤ t ≤
κ(δ), with values in { 1, 2, . . . , n }, the former with the same distribution as
strategy x∗ and the latter with the same distribution as strategy y∗, that is
we have P{It = i} = x∗i and P
{
Jt = j
}
= y∗j for i, j = 1, 2, . . . , n. Define
the random distributions X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) and Y = (Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn), with
values in [0, 1]n, by setting:
Xi =
1
κ(δ)
·
κ(δ)∑
t=1
[It = i] and Yj =
1
κ(δ)
·
κ(δ)∑
t=1
[Jt = j].
Note that every realization of Y is a κ(δ)-uniform strategy that uses the pure
strategy j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, with probabilityKj/κ(δ), whereKj =
∑κ(δ)
t=1 [Jt = j] is the
number of indices t, 1 ≤ t ≤ κ(δ), for which Jt = j. A similar characterization
holds for every realization of X . Observe also that supp(X) ⊆ supp(x∗) and
supp(Y ) ⊆ supp(y∗) because for all i and j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, the random variablesXi
and Yj are identically equal to 0 unless x
∗
i > 0 and y
∗
j > 0, respectively.
Since we want (a realization of) the random strategies X and Y to well
support a certain pair of values, we now characterize Ri•Y , for all i ∈ supp(x∗);
the whole reasoning presented below for Ri•Y can be carried out analogously
for XTC•j , for all j = 1, 2, . . . , n, and hence it is omitted.
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First, observe that for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n, we have:
Ri•Y =
n∑
j=1
RijYj =
1
κ(δ)
·
n∑
j=1
Rij ·
κ(δ)∑
t=1
[Jt = j] =
1
κ(δ)
·
κ(δ)∑
t=1
RiJt .
Therefore, the random variable Ri•Y is equal to the arithmetic average
Zi =
1
κ(δ)
·
κ(δ)∑
t=1
Zit
of the independent random variables Zit = RiJt , 1 ≤ t ≤ κ(δ).
For every i ∈ supp(x∗), we will apply Hoeffding’s inequality to the corre-
sponding random variable Zi. Hoeffding’s inequality gives an exponential upper
bound for the probability of large deviations of the arithmetic average of inde-
pendent and bounded random variables from their expectation.
Lemma 1 (Hoeffding’s inequality). Let Z1, Z2, . . . , Zk be independent ran-
dom variables with 0 ≤ Zt ≤ 1 for every t, let Z = (1/k) ·
∑k
t=1 Zt, and let E
{
Z
}
be its expectation. Then for all δ > 0, we have P
{
Z − E{Z} ≤ −δ} ≤ e−2δ2k.
Before we apply Hoeffding’s inequality to the random variables Zi defined
above, observe that for every t = 1, 2, . . . , κ(δ), we have:
E{Zit} = E{RiJt} =
n∑
j=1
Rij · P{Jt = j} = Ri•y∗.
Note, however, that if i ∈ supp(x∗) then E{Zit} = Ri•y∗ = v∗, because (x∗, y∗)
is a Nash equilibrium, and hence every i ∈ supp(x∗) is a best response to y∗. It
follows that E
{
Zi
}
= (1/κ(δ)) ·∑κ(δ)t=1 E{Zit} = v∗.
Applying Hoeffding’s inequality, for every i ∈ supp(x∗), we get:
P{Ri•Y < v∗ − δ} = P
{
Zi − E
{
Zi
}
< −δ} ≤ e−2δ2κ(δ). (1)
It follows that if I ⊆ supp(x∗) and |I| ≤ κ(δ), then:
P
{
Ri•Y < v
∗ − δ for some i ∈ I} ≤
≤
∑
i∈I
P
{
Ri•Y < v
∗ − δ} ≤ κ(δ) · e−2δ2κ(δ) = 2δ2 ln(1/δ) < 1
2
, (2)
for all δ > 0. The first inequality holds by the union bound, and the second
follows from (1) and because |I| ≤ κ(δ). The last inequality can be verified by
observing that the function f(x) = 2x2 ln(1/x), for x > 0, achieves its maximum
at x = 1/
√
e and f(1/
√
e) = 1/e < 1/2.
In a similar way we can prove that if J ⊆ supp(y∗) and |J | ≤ κ(δ), then:
P
{
XTC•j < (x
∗)TCy∗ − δ for some j ∈ J} < 1
2
, (3)
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for all δ > 0.
We are now ready to argue that
P
{
Ri•Y ≥ v∗ − δ for all i ∈ supp(X),
and XTC•j ≥ u∗ − δ for all j ∈ supp(Y )
}
> 0,
and hence there must be realizations x, y ∈ [0, 1]n of the random variables X =
(X1, X2, . . . , Xn) and Y = (Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn), such that (x, y) well supports
(
v∗ −
δ, u∗ − δ). Indeed, we have:
P
{
Ri•Y < v
∗ − δ for some i ∈ supp(X),
or XTC•j < u
∗ − δ for some j ∈ supp(Y )}
≤
∑
I⊆supp(x∗)
P
{
I = supp(X) and Ri•Y < v
∗ − δ for some i ∈ I}
+
∑
J⊆supp(y∗)
P
{
J = supp(Y ) and XTC•j < u
∗ − δ for some j ∈ J}
=
∑
I⊆supp(x∗)
|I|≤κ(δ)
P
{
I = supp(X)
} ·P{Ri•Y < v∗− δ for some i ∈ I ∣∣ I = supp(X)}
+
∑
J⊆supp(y∗)
|J|≤κ(δ)
P
{
J = supp(Y )
}·P{XTC•j < u∗−δ for some j ∈ J ∣∣ J = supp(Y )}
<
∑
I⊆supp(x∗)
P
{
I = supp(X)
} · 1
2
+
∑
J⊆supp(y∗)
P
{
J = supp(Y )
} · 1
2
= 1,
where the first inequality follows from the union bound, and from supp(X) ⊆
supp(x∗) and supp(Y ) ⊆ supp(y∗); the equality holds because |supp(X)| ≤ κ(δ)
and |supp(Y )| ≤ κ(δ) by the definitions of X and Y ; and the latter (strict)
inequality follows from (2) and (3).
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